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1 Introduction
The rapid rise of social protection up the
development policy agenda has been startling, even
alarming. Part of the explanation is to be found in a
growing recognition that social protection can be
functional to the achievement of bigger
development objectives, including even economic
growth and the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs). Mounting evidence that well-designed social
transfers can contribute to poverty reduction is
appealing to development economists and
policymakers who were previously sceptical about
social protection’s unloved parents, ‘social safety
nets’, which were disparaged during the 1990s as
politically expedient, socially stigmatising and fiscally
unaffordable in poor countries. The ‘safety nets’
agenda was vigorously attacked equally from the left
(for its social residualism and political cynicism) as
from the right (for displacing informal social security
mechanisms and creating dependency on
unsustainable handouts) until it curled up and died,
only to be triumphantly reborn as ‘social protection’
around the turn of the millennium.
So what’s the difference? For one thing, the new
social protection agenda comes with a fresh array of
conceptual frameworks, analytical tools, empirical
evidence, national policy processes, heavyweight
agencies and big names in development studies
aligned behind it. Secondly, social protection appears
to be equally amenable to appropriation by the ‘right’
(who are now inviting the poor to participate in
economic growth opportunities with revitalising
injections of targeted transfers) and the ‘left’ (who are
hooking their ‘rights-based approaches’ onto the
social protection bandwagon). Thirdly, the social
protection agenda prioritises moving people from
dependency into productive livelihoods, wherever
possible. This concept of ‘graduation’ distinguishes
social protection from the narrower set of purely
welfarist measures, which are just a part of the
toolkit.
Advocates for social protection fall into two broad
camps, which we will label the ‘instrumentalists’ and
the ‘activists’. ‘Instrumentalist’ arguments point to
the dysfunctionality of extreme poverty, inequality,
risk and vulnerability to the achievement of
development targets on which there is broad
consensus, currently embodied in the MDGs. For this
‘social protection for efficient development’ camp,
social protection is about putting in place risk
management mechanisms that will compensate for
incomplete or missing insurance (and other) markets,
until such time as poverty reduction and market
deepening allow private insurance to play a more
prominent role.
‘Activist’ arguments view the persistence of extreme
poverty, inequality and vulnerability as symptoms of
social injustice and structural inequity, and campaign
for social protection as an inviolable right of
citizenship. For these ‘social protection for social
justice’ placard-wavers, targeted welfarist handouts
are a necessary but perhaps uncomfortable
intermediate step between ad hoc humanitarianism
and the ideal of a guaranteed ‘universal social
minimum’, where entitlement extends far beyond
cash or food transfers and is based on citizenship, not
philanthropy or enlightened self-interest.
Intriguingly, these ideological battles are being
fought out around basic and seemingly technical
choices in social protection policies and programmes:
choices of instruments (social pensions, public works,
etc.) and choices in design (targeting vs. universal
provision, cash vs. food aid, conditional vs.
unconditional transfers). Where a convergence
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between ‘economic’ and ‘social’ goals can be
demonstrated, consensus is possible – but these
opportunities are few and far between. Take
minimum wages: in discussions around
mainstreaming social protection into Uganda’s
Poverty Eradication Action Plan in 2003, the editors
of this IDS Bulletin argued for a binding statutory
minimum wage to be applied to exploited
agricultural workers in Uganda’s plantation sector.
Although the argument was made on social justice
grounds, the Ministry of Finance was not convinced
until empirical evidence from several countries was
produced, confirming that raising wages for
underpaid workers does not necessarily result in
‘disemployment’ effects and can even raise
productivity and profits.
Anyone who believes that design choices in social
protection programmes – whether to apply
conditions, to transfer cash or food, who to target –
are purely pragmatic technical issues, with decisions
based on solid empirical evidence, is missing the
point. These are ideological choices, reflecting the
‘vision thing’ that Kabeer refers to in this IDS Bulletin.
Which choices are made, and for what reasons,
reflects the kind of society that policymakers and
technocrats with power to direct social policy wish
to promote. Compare the Government of India’s
recent decision to enact an employment guarantee
for all rural households, with the attitude of the
United States towards welfare provision for its
citizens. Social protection is self-evidently about a
vision of society.
Some of these visions are debated in the papers that
follow this Introduction. This issue of the IDS Bulletin
revives a tradition of debate that was a feature of its
early years, but disappeared some decades ago. The
first part of this IDS Bulletin is titled ‘Thinking’. Five
conceptual frameworks or approaches to social
protection are introduced by their protagonists (the
World Bank, IDS, OECD, etc). These frameworks are
critiqued – commentators were encouraged to be
provocative and pithy – and the protagonists are
given a ‘right to reply’ to their critics. Some stirring
encounters are the result. In the second part, titled
‘Practice’, this approach is pursued in some key
design choices, including the cash vs. food debate,
the conditionality debate, and targeting. The issue
closes with two reflective pieces on applications of
social protection to vulnerabilities in smallholder
agriculture and health (HIV and AIDS).
2 Thinking: framing the debates
Five conceptual frameworks are presented and
dissected in the ‘Thinking’ section of this IDS Bulletin:
‘Social Risk Management’ (World Bank),
‘Transformative Social Protection’ (IDS Sussex), ‘Asset
Thresholds’ (Michael Carter and Christopher Barrett),
the POVNET approach (DAC/OECD), and the
‘Universal Social Minimum’ (Koy Thomson/ActionAid).
Two of these five frameworks are the product of
donor agencies, two come from universities and one
originates from an NGO. This diversity of sources is
encouraging for those who lament that social
protection is an entirely donor-driven agenda.
We start with the Social Risk Management (SRM)
framework, which has become the most influential
approach to social protection in recent years, not
least because it has been heavily promoted by the
World Bank through its financing, research, training
and policy advice. A defining insight of SRM is that
poverty and vulnerability are compounded by
uninsured risk, so effective risk management will not
only stabilise income and consumption but is an
investment in poverty reduction. Advocates of SRM
make a virtue of its focus on risk and efficiency
rather than equity and needs. According to
Holzmann and Kozel (this IDS Bulletin), the World
Bank’s Social Protection Strategy ‘is innovative in
placing particular emphasis on risk and risk
management as a complement to social protection’s
more traditional emphasis on equity and basic needs’.
To evaluate the SRM framework, we threw the
weight of the IDS Director and three IDS students
into the fray. Lawrence Haddad opens with a gentle
rebuke about SRM’s ‘failure to engage’ with politics,
anthropology, geography, sociology and psychology:
‘after all, the “S” in SRM stands for social’. As
Guenther, Huda and Macauslan then point out, the
SRM focus on risk management ‘leads to
interventions that focus on transitory income shocks
rather than on structural determinants of poverty’.
Both sets of comments point to SRM’s narrow
conceptualisation of risk, especially its neglect of
‘social risk’ and ‘irreversibility’, which Haddad
attributes to the World Bank’s ‘commitment to
mono-disciplinarity’. In their ‘right to reply’,
Holzmann and Kozel acknowledge the ‘bias toward
economic interpretation’ but argue that SRM is open
to drawing on other disciplines, and reassert that
SRM has shifted the social protection discourse from
‘advocacy’ toward ‘evidence-based policy’.
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The ‘Transformative Social Protection’ (TSP)
framework was devised partly in response to a
concern that the increasingly hegemonic Social Risk
Management framework was really only about
‘economic risk management’. TSP endorses the
World Bank belief that risk matters and that social
protection can be supportive of economic growth –
through links to ‘prevention’ (insurance) and
‘promotion’ (productivity-enhancing) interventions –
but complements this by adding a ‘social’ strand to
parallel the ‘economic’. Analytically, TSP argues for
reconceptualising ‘vulnerability’ as ‘emerging from
and embedded in the socio-political context’
(Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, this IDS Bulletin),
and requiring interventions that effectively tackle the
structural causes of vulnerability. ‘Transformative
social protection’ extends beyond safety nets and
welfare handouts, towards supporting citizens to
claim social protection from the state as a basic right.
A second group of IDS students was invited to critique
Transformative Social Protection. Ken Aoo and his
colleagues identify a contradiction in TSP’s claims to
empower the poor and its prescriptive agenda for
transformation, which could be interpreted as
patronising at the micro-level and violating national
sovereignty at the macro-level. A related critique is
that the concept of TSP is too broad and holistic to be
operationally useful. Replying to their students,
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux counter that any
development policy implies ‘meddling’ in the politics
and culture of other countries, and that TSP is not all-
encompassing but favours interventions that maximise
synergies between (social) ‘protection’ and (economic)
‘promotion’.
Carter and Barrett present an intriguing application
of recent economic thinking and analysis to social
protection. The basic idea of ‘asset thresholds’ is that
a critical level of assets exists above which people can
‘invest productively, accumulate and advance’, but
below which people are in a ‘poverty trap’ from
which they have no prospects of escape. Empirical
evidence plus modelling reveals the profound
implications for social protection policy of this
bifurcation – for instance, humanitarian assistance that
maintains subsistence consumption does not prevent
asset depletion and only pushes increasing numbers
of people into chronic poverty and a ‘relief trap’.
Stefan Dercon critiques the ‘unidimensional’ focus of
the asset thresholds framework on assets, and its
neglect of institutional failures (e.g. caste structure) and
market failures (e.g. inflexible land rights) that can also
induce ‘threshold effects’. One implication of all
threshold models, noted by Dercon, is that limited
social protection resources should rather be expended
on protecting people from sliding below the threshold
– a genuine ‘safety net’ function – it is cheaper to keep
people from falling down a ravine than helping them
to climb out. The corollary is that chronic poverty is
unlikely to be reduced at all by small, targeted cash
transfers; notwithstanding the current popularity of
these social protection programmes. ‘Small is not
beautiful – it is useless for the poor.’ Replying to
Dercon, Carter and Barrett emphasise several points
of agreement, and suggest a bifurcated policy
response: ‘large-scale transfers to the very poor and
threshold-based social protection for the vulnerable’.
The next conceptual framework in this section is
presented by the chair of the POVNET Task Team on
Social Protection and Social Policy. Timo Voipio
asserts that the OECD/DAC approach to poverty
reduction has always been inflected by Nordic values
of social development, which produced a multi-
dimensional understanding of poverty and a focus on
pro-poor growth that combines ‘economic
opportunities, social protection and
inclusion/empowerment’. In this context, Voipio sees
social protection performing two roles: ‘as a key
element of pro-poor growth but also as a rights-
based responsibility to care’.
Naila Kabeer is not convinced that POVNET thinking
on social protection represents a convergence of
views, rather than an uneasy compromise between
‘members of the club of the world’s richest
countries’, who bring ‘somewhat different
philosophies and agendas’ to the table. Kabeer prises
open a key area of disagreement, between ‘the
World Bank’s residualist approach’ and the Nordic
commitment to universal basic social security, and
argues that this reflects two radically different visions
of society: the former individualistic and market-
based; the latter group-based and citizen-centred.
Ultimately, Voipio appears to agree with Kabeer that
the achievement of effective and equitable social
protection in any society is a struggle for democratic
rights, one that is more likely to be realised through
collective action than donor projects.
This is precisely the keystone on which Koy Thomson
constructs his justification for a ‘Universal Social
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Minimum’, by which he means the ‘resources,
opportunities, rights and power to lead an
adequately decent and dignified life, and to
participate and advance as a free and equal member
in society’. This is an explicitly ‘political programme’
grounded in human rights and social justice theories,
rather than an economic policy debate to be left to
‘technocrats’. This approach to social protection
requires a broader conceptualisation of poverty and
of development, more reminiscent of Sen’s
‘capabilities’ approach and his ‘development as
freedom’ argument.
As ‘friendly critics’ of the universal social minimum,
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux fully endorse its
aspirations but question its practicality, specifically its
‘ideological egalitarianism’, which risks leaving all poor
people poor but equal rather than ‘giving some
people a hand-up out of poverty’. They also doubt
whether the fiscal resources and political
constituencies exist in poor countries to provide a
minimum package of resource transfers and social
rights within national budgets and political processes,
or whether this agenda will remain externally induced
and financed for years to come. Thomson concedes
that some of the most important constituencies for
social protection – ‘Parliamentarians, civil society
organisations, the media, the public’ – have been
alienated from current debates around social
protection, but believes that the universal social
minimum could provide a platform for mobilising
these constituencies.
3 Practice: what to do?
Many issues in the design of social protection
programmes that might appear to be mere practical
details have provoked fierce theoretical and empirical
debates, and ongoing controversy. Three of these
design issues are debated here: conditionality, cash vs.
food, and targeting. These ‘downstream’ policy
choices bear close scrutiny because they track the
same intellectual fault-line that runs through
‘upstream’ thinking and conceptualisation of what
social protection is all about. Crudely, most
‘instrumentalists’ would line up behind conditional
transfers, in either food or cash depending on
programme objectives, and fine targeting. Conversely,
most ‘activists’ would argue for unconditional
transfers, preferably in cash rather than food, and
universal entitlements. For the instrumentalists, a key
concern is how to maximise efficiency in resource
transfers: conditionality achieves a double impact, and
pro-poor targeting minimises leakages to the non-
poor. For the activists, two key considerations are
how to maximise freedom of choice (hence
unconditional transfers, in cash) and how to entrench
social protection as a right (hence universal provision).1
We start this section with three very different
perspectives on conditionality. Armando Barrientos
gives three cheers (or at least two-and-a-half) for
conditional transfer programmes, citing empirical
evidence that requiring poor parents to send their
children to schools and clinics in return for resource
transfers does indeed achieve the desired ‘double
impact’ on household consumption as well as pro-
poor investment in human capital. Most of
Barrientos’ witnesses for the defence come from
Latin America, where the public services on which
transfers are conditioned are more extensive and
more effective than in much of sub-Saharan Africa.
This leaves unanswered the question of whether
conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are transferable to
poorer and institutionally weaker countries in Africa,
where CCTs have yet to be widely adopted.
Maxine Molyneux offers an ironic ‘Two Cheers for
CCTs’ (rather than three), welcoming the evidence
for ‘positive outcomes in children’s welfare’ but
urging caution over some ‘overblown claims’ made
on behalf of conditional cash transfers. Molyneux is
especially concerned about adverse gender impacts,
agreeing that women are central to these
programmes but pointing out that their role is
largely confined to ‘servicing the needs of others’,
especially their children. Generally, it is mothers –
not fathers – who are monitored for compliance
with the conditionalities imposed by CCTs, thereby
reinforcing women’s role as carers of children, while
men remain marginalised. Molyneux asks pointedly:
in what sense does this empower women?
No cheers at all from Nicholas Freeland, whose
depiction of conditional cash transfers as ‘economically
superfluous, physically pernicious, morally atrocious and
politically abominable’ is hardly a ringing endorsement.
Freeland argues that the word ‘conditional’ is
imprecise, since ‘all social transfers are conditional on
something’; that the word is reminiscent of IMF and
World Bank loan conditionalities and ‘smacks of
Bretton Woods paternalism’; that conditions are
unnecessary because the poor tend to spend some of
their social transfers on services anyway (and they
should be free to make these choices); and that
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imposing any conditions on social transfers for the poor
violates the principle (which most countries have signed
up to) that social protection is a ‘basic human right’.
Turning next to the thorny issue of cash transfers vs.
food aid, we invited Paul Harvey (who is based at the
Overseas Development Institute (ODI), which has
recently taken up the case for cash transfers in
emergencies) to debate with Ugo Gentilini (who is
based at the World Food Programme (WFP), where
posters in the corridors proclaim: ‘We Feed People’).
Harvey lists several advantages of cash over food
transfers (e.g. cost-effectiveness, choice and dignity),
and asserts that many alleged negative features of
cash (higher security and corruption risks, lower
nutritional impacts, etc.) have been exaggerated.
Gentilini argues that the choice of cash or food
should not be elevated to a principle – ‘cash and food
are just instruments and not strategies’ – but should
be determined by the context and objectives of each
social protection intervention. A particular context-
specific concern is how local markets function and
how traders, producers and prices will respond to
cash and/or food transfers. More generally, Gentilini
cites recent empirical evidence suggesting that the
‘anti-food movement’ has overstated the
dependency and disincentive effects of food aid.
Harvey agrees with Gentilini’s conclusion that ‘cash
and food can be complementary’ in theory, but
points out that in practice food aid continues to
drive the global humanitarian system. Until
international aid is untied from donor food surpluses
and national governments play the lead role in
humanitarian response, agency decisions will not be
based on evidence and food will continue to be
provided even when cash would be more
appropriate. Gentilini’s riposte focuses on Harvey’s
belief that cash transfers will inevitably increase and
ultimately displace food aid in most emergencies.
Gentilini argues that the evidence base on the
impacts of cash in emergencies is mixed, that market
failures pose a real threat to cash transfer
programmes, and that beneficiaries often express a
preference for food rather than cash, which it is
‘inappropriate’ to ignore.
John Hoddinott ends our policy debates by debating
targeting with himself – ‘Social protection: to target
or not to target?’ – but reveals his bias immediately
by offering ‘two vignettes’ that illuminate how
targeted social transfers ‘do indeed deliver a greater
share of programme benefits to poor households’.
Canada’s Old Age Security pension is amusing as
well as enlightening: attempting to reconcile equity
(universalism) with efficiency (pro-poor targeting),
the Canadian government delivers this pension to all
its citizens, but taxes it at 100 per cent for the non-
poor! Hoddinott concedes that the various costs of
targeting – to administrators, beneficiaries and their
communities – can be significant, but he maintains
that the savings in reduced leakages to the non-poor
usually outweigh these costs. Finally, although this is
essentially an economic analysis that refutes
arguments for universal provision grounded in social
justice, Hoddinott is emphatically opposed to
exploiting social stigma for efficient self-targeting:
‘this is wrong wrong wrong’.
The closing pair of papers in this compilation apply
current thinking on social protection to two key
sectors for poor people – agriculture and health –
but speak to a bigger and urgent need for social
protection interventions to be informed by improved
analysis. Rebecca Holmes, John Farrington and
Rachel Slater argue against the tendency to draw an
artificial distinction between ‘consumption-
smoothing’ social protection interventions designed
to address vulnerability in the ‘domestic’ domain, and
‘productivity-enhancing’ interventions designed to
achieve pro-poor growth in the ‘productive’ domain.
Especially in sectors like smallholder agriculture,
where the homestead is also the workplace and the
workforce is dominated by family labour, the
synergies between the two domains are so strong
that an integrated rather than dichotomised
approach to social protection and other pro-poor
policies is clearly called for.
The final paper rounds off this IDS Bulletin by
bringing together fresh ideas for improved analysis
and response. Jerker Edström builds a case for
reconceptualising ‘vulnerability’, the defining concept
that motivates all social protection, but one that is
often inadequately understood and weakly carried
through into policy design and implementation. By
disaggregating vulnerability into ‘embodied and
personal biological and psychological dimensions of
susceptibility/resistance and sensitivity/responsiveness,
with contextual inter-personal and environmental
dimensions’, Edström implicitly lays out a range of
entry points for social protection interventions. How
many policymakers consider whether their social
protection programmes are aimed at strengthening
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resistance, reducing sensitivity, or addressing the
environmental determinants of vulnerability?
Edström also questions the usefulness of the
household as a unit of analysis and response, when
so much social protection is a response to the
breakdown of families (e.g. street children) and
access to (or exclusion from) support from extended
families and communities is a critical determinant of
individual vulnerability or resilience. Although
Edström is preoccupied with vulnerabilities related to
HIV and AIDS, these arguments apply equally to all
social protection thinking and practice.
4 Conclusion
This selective overview of conceptual frameworks
and practical dilemmas in social protection has
highlighted how rapidly thinking and practice have
moved forward in a few short years, but it has also
revealed that a range of conceptual, empirical and
policy issues remain unresolved. Some of these issues
will resolve themselves, as evidence and experience
accumulate, lessons are learned and best practice is
institutionalised within agencies responsible for
delivering social protection. Other issues pose bigger
questions, however. At every level – conceptual
frameworks, evidence-building, and policy processes
– there are basic disagreements and debates
between alternative approaches that are not
amenable to consensus or compromise.
4.1 Conceptual challenges
All of the conceptual frameworks discussed in this
IDS Bulletin are preoccupied with social protection as
a response to the economic and social vulnerabilities
that poor people face, yet none of these frameworks
seems up to the task of comprehensively describing
the risk environment and proposing a focused and
appropriate set of policy options to mitigate or
reduce vulnerabilities. For instance, a fundamental
distinction has emerged between conceptual
approaches that incorporate structural vulnerability in
their understanding of the risk environment, and
make social inclusion an explicit objective of social
protection programming, and those that do not. Can
these two approaches complement each other, or
are they inevitably in opposition? More broadly, is
there any scope for bringing together the
contrasting visions of the ‘instrumentalists’ and the
‘activists’, or is this an ideological fault-line that
divides the two camps as sharply as that dividing the
interests of capital and labour?
4.2 Evidence gaps
The evidence base on what works in social
protection and what doesn’t is patchy, but studies
are accumulating and the gaps are rapidly being
filled. The ‘cash vs. food’ debate, for instance, reveals
the importance of basing policy choices on a sound
analysis of local markets and the articulated
preferences of (female and male) beneficiaries, rather
than on resource availability or an untested belief
that one form of transfer is always best. A similar
case for context-specific programming is presented
by the debate on conditionalities in social protection,
which must take account of the quality and
availability of local services on which transfers are
conditioned, and should also assess much more
carefully the implications for women.
A very different challenge is presented by the
evidence on ‘asset thresholds’. If these do exist in
reality, such that poor people need large ‘lumpy’
transfers to escape from poverty and ‘graduate’ from
dependence on social assistance, then tiny transfers
are indeed ‘useless for the poor’, and the value in
campaigning for a ‘universal social minimum’ is
seriously compromised. The underlying issue here is
familiar from social welfare debates: does a rights-
based approach to redistributive transfers inevitably
put the brakes on economic growth, and if so, to
what extent is each society willing to trade off
economic growth against social equity?
4.3 Policy processes
A final set of concerns asks the question: where are
the drivers of social protection coming from? Too
much of the current social protection agenda is
designed and financed by external actors – bilateral
and multilateral donors, international NGOs,
academics and consultants – and not enough is
driven by domestic constituencies – national
governments, local civil society, citizens. This has
unsatisfactory and potentially ominous implications
for the ownership of these processes, accountability
for delivery and impacts, and political and financial
sustainability of social protection programmes. There
are simply ‘too many pilots and not enough drivers’
of social protection, especially in Africa, which has
yet again become a laboratory for experimentation,
this time with dozens of ‘boutique’ cash transfer pilot
projects that are weakly grounded in domestic policy
processes and are rarely institutionalised at scale by
national governments.
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The ultimate goal, surely, should be nationally owned
social protection policies, underpinned by a ‘social
contract’ between the state and its citizens, where
governments acknowledge that social protection is a
right for which they are the duty-bearers, and
citizens mobilise to demand that this right is
effectively delivered to them. The risk of not moving
rapidly in this direction is that social protection will
fall as quickly as it has risen, and become in a few
years’ time just another shooting star in the history
of development policy.
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Note
1 Of course, this distinction is deliberately drawn
excessively sharply here. Many social protection
‘activists’ are (or should be) also preoccupied with
efficiency, and most ‘instrumentalists’ would claim
to be deeply concerned with equity – indeed,
they would argue that the efficient, pro-poor
allocation of scarce public resources is a
prerequisite for social justice.
